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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in the Search for Workable
Standards of Judicial Review of Piecemeal Rezoning
In 1926, the Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
held that zoning is a legislative determination subject to a limited scope of
judicial review.' Now a trend toward modification of that principle has
emerged. The half-century since the Supreme Court established the constitu-
tionality of zoning in Euclid has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number
and complexity of land use regulations enacted under the aegis of the zoning
power.2 Moreover, a "new mood"8 has emerged which suggests that private
property should serve "a variety of public purposes beyond its function as
a medium of private investment."' 4  This perception of the societal implica-
tions of land use has necessitated allowing local zoning boards to exercise
much greater regulatory power over private property.5 When that power is
directed at selected parcels on a piecemeal basis, however, the potential for
arbitrary disregard of private property rights is substantial.6 The inordinate
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See pp. 298-99 & notes 25-30 infra. The broad principle
of Euclid was recently affirmed in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
2. Such regulations include height and setback restrictions, minimum lot size, sub-
division controls, aesthetic and architectural controls, minimum floor space require-
ments, limitations on the number of bedrooms, specification of the timing of develop-
ment, and requirements regarding the contribution of parkland and school sites. See gen-
erally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
(1972), a detailed examination of new regulatory techniques prepared for the Council
on Environmental Quality.
3. In their recent report, The Use of Land, the Citizens' Advisory Committee
on Environmental Quality describes changing attitudes toward the use of land
as a "new mood" in the nation, a mood that recognizes for the first time that
decisions regarding the use of land will have a major impact on our society.
It suggests land use decisions must take into account a whole range of social,
economic, and environmental factors which in the past have often been ig-
nored.
Bosselman, Downzoning, 32 URBAN LAND 3, 4 (1973).
4. Id. at 4.
5. This trend is comprehensively treated in F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA,
THE TAKING ISSUE 212-35 (1973).
6. While all legislation effects a redistribution of benefits and detriments in a soci-
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use of zoning amendments as the principal means of land use control has
focused attention on this problem.7
Zoning litigation usually arises in one of three ways: 8 either the landowner
challenges the zoning board's approval of higher density use for a neighboring
property, 9 the landowner challenges the refusal of the zoning board to in-
crease density on 'his property, or the landowner challenges the action of the
zoning board, which sua sponte has reduced the permissible density of his
land. All three of these situations have traditionally been denominated as
"piecemeal rezonings."' 10 However, the term "downzoning" is increasingly
used to describe the third situation, a zoning board's sua sponte reduction
of density."'
ety, individual property rights are seldom affected as directly or with so much opportu-
nity for abuse as in a rezoning. Theoretically, unpopular policies are subject to reversal
at the polls, but since rezonings affect specific individuals rather than a broad-based
segment of the electorate, it is unlikely that a significant political counterforce could
be generated. Consequently, as a student commentator has noted, "because of the pro-
cedural informality and limited judicial review which accompany legislative action, the
presence of improprieties looms large, and individual rights are often sacrificed either
on the altar of public opinion or ex parte over a lunch at the club." Comment, Zoning
Amendments-the Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130,
132 (1972).
7. In practice, however, it is the changes that are more important than the reg-
ulations. The National Commission on Urban Problems found that most com-
munities use the "wait and see" approach to zoning. Thus it is the process that
is important, not the original zoning plan. Rather than being contained in a
published plan, "the community's real land use policy comes to be expressed in
the zoning amendment."
Bosselman, supra note 3, at 4.
8. A fourth avenue of litigation is appeal from the decision of the board of ad-
justment upon denial of a request for a variance or special exception. These decisions
do not contemplate zoning changes. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 14.04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. Consequently, they will not be con-
sidered here.
9. To prevent undue population concentration and overcrowding of land, zoning or-
dinances usually establish density limits by prescribing minimum lot area restrictions
and building height, setback, and yard requirements. See 1 ANDERSON § 7.06; 2
id. §§ 8.41-.44. Density regulation is expressly authorized by enabling legislation and
is generally upheld as a valid health measure. Id. However, in recent years, density re-
strictions which tend to exclude classes of persons from a community have been fre-
quently invalidated. See note 24 infra.
10. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209
(1965); MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965);
Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951).
11. The term downzoning, used here to refer to a density reduction, would also in-
clude a reduction in intensity of use, e.g., from commercial use to residential use. While
some courts now refer to density reduction as downzoning, others continue to describe
density reduction by a number of terms including upzoning, upgrading or simply rezon-
ing. The profession now appears to have settled on the term downzoning. See ALI-
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
The enactment of both comprehensive zoning ordinances and piecemeal
rezoning amendments 12 is a legi:la-tive function.13  Not only are zoning
ordinances accorded the usual presumption of constitutional validity which
attaches to legislation, but if the validity of the ordinance is even "fairly
debatable" the ordinance must be sustained. 1 4  While the burden of proof
imposed on the complainant under this standard is not insuperable,' 5 it has
generally been recognized as most difficult to overcome. 16 Courts which
queston the effeciveness of the traditonal rev'ew standards to protect
property rights face the challenge of devising a more workable standard of
revew-one which meaningfu'ly checks arbitrary rezon'ngs without hamper-
ing local efforts to change zoning plans which may be "obsolete in the light
of pre3ent sophistication in our awareness of land use implications.' 1 7
In its first opportunity to consider the appropriate standard of judicial re-
view of piecemeal downzoning, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Board of
Superv.sors v. Snell Construction Corp.,a" established a somewhat novel
standard which dim'nished the presumpt'on of validity of piecemeal down-
zon:ng ord'nances. The plaintiff-landowner filed an application to rezone
sixteen acres of his twenty-six acre tract from single family residential to resi-
dential townhouse, ten uni's per acre (RT-10). On the urging of the county
land use staff, the application was amended to request high density zoning
(up to seventy-five units per acre) on a portion of the tract and RT-10 on
the remainder, in conformance with the recommended densities of a newly
adopted master plan. The planning board recommended rezoning the entire
ABA/ULI STUDY MATERIALS OF THE ALI-ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LE-
GAL EDUCATION, LAND USE L*TIGATION: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR ATTORNEYS, DEVELOPERS
AN-) PUBLIC OFFICIALS 269 (1974).
12. The term piecemeal zoning is not susceptible of precise definition. In general,
the term refers to a zoning amendment "which establishes distr'cts and regulates land
uses in palt, tut not all, of tl:e terr:toiy of a municipality." I ANDERSON § 5.14. While
application of the term is generally confinzd to rezonings of small areas, one court hzld
that an o:'dinance which iezoned 29 acres of a 650 acre tract was a piecemeal rezoning.
MacDo:.iald v. Boa:d of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
A distinction shou!d be made between piecemeal zoning and spot zoning. The term
spot zoni-g is normally applied to rezoning of a single landowner and to a use which
is significantly cut of character with, and likely to disturb the tenor of the neighborhood.
It is most often lim'ted to rezonirg very small ra cels and would rarely be applied to
one as large as 29 acres. See 1 ANDERSON §§ 5.04-.08.
13. See 2 ANDERSON § 14.04.
14. Soe p. 299 & note 27 infir.
15. See 1 ANDERSON § 2.16, at 76.
16. See id. § 2.17, at 77.
17. Bosselman, supra note 3, at 4.
18. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
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tract RT-10, but the board of supervisors enacted an ordinance rezoning the
tract for high density and RT-10 uses as the landowner requested. One year
later, a newly elected board downzoned the high density use to RT-10. The
trial court, in granting the landowner's motion for declaratory judgment,
found the downzoning was not based upon a substantial change in circum-
stances or mistake in the original zoning and therefore held the downzoning
ordinance invalid as arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 19 On appeal to
the Virginia Supreme Court,20 the board argued that the absence of a change
or mistake does not render the zoning ordinance unreasonable. 21 It argued
alternatively that the previous board's approval of higher density use in the
face of sewer and traffic problems was a mistake, even if done knowingly.
22
Further, the board argued that the new board's unwillingness to accept
higher densities in light of substantial proof of continued deterioration of
sewage and road facilities constituted a change within the rule enunciated
by the trial court.2
3
In affirming, the supreme court unanimously held that a piecemeal down-
zoning ordinance is invalid as unreasonable unless based on a change in cir-
cumstances which substantially affects the public health, safety, or welfare,
or unless based on a mistake in the original zoning. Once the landowner
makes a prima facie showing that there has been no change in circumstances,
the burden of going forward with the evidence of a change or mistake shifts
to the governing body. If the governing body produces sufficient evidence
to make the existence of a change or mistake fairly debatable, the ordinance
must be sustained. The court held, as a matter of law, that the election of
a new board of supervisors did not constitute a change of circumstances with-
in the rule. The opinion did not explicitly consider the board's argument
that the increase of density in the face of traffic and sewer problems was
a mistake justifying the downzoning. Rather, the court concluded that the
board produced no evidence probative of mistake or change. The "change
or mistake" rule enunciated by the Virginia court represents another in a
series of recent decisions departing from traditional review standards.
This Recent Development will compare the standards of review of piece-
19. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., Chancery No. 36495 (Va. Cir. Ct.,
Nov. 24, 1972) (letter opinion), aff'd, 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
20. There is no intermediate appellate division in the Virginia court system and no
appeal to the supreme court as a matter of right. The supreme court, after review of
the application for a writ of error, determines if the appeal should be allowed. See
VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-462 (1957).
21. Brief for Appellant at 8-17, Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va.
655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
22. Id. at 20-22.
23. Id. at 22-23.
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meal rezonings under the Snell decision with those established by the highest
courts of Maryland, New York, and Oregon. These decisions have reduced
the presumption of validity traditionally accorded rezoning amendments ei-
ther by shifting the burden of proof to the governing body, by imposing sub-
stantive limitations on the rezoning power, or by employing the broader re-
view standards of quasi-judicial actions to rezoning challenges. Emphasis
will be placed on the impact these standards are likely to have on affected
landowners and on a community's ability to regulate land use effectively.
24
I. TRADITIONAL REVIEW STANDARDS
The majority of courts have established a very limited scope for reviewing
piecemeal rezoning decisions. Under the standard of review established in
Euclid, the complaining landowner assumes the burden of proving the zoning
ordinance unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, that it bears no relation to
the public health, safety or general welfare, 25 or that it amounts to a taking.
2 6
24. A related but distinct development is the trend toward heightened judicial scru-
tiny of zoning ordinances which are alleged to have an exclusionary effect. See Town-
ship of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973)
(zoning ordinance which did not provide sufficient land area for apartments generally,
nor for lower cost apartments, was unconstitutional) and authorities cited therein at 463-
64 nn.2, 3, 300 A.2d at 112 nn.2, 3; Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210 (1973); 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 1035, 1045 (1973). Notwithstanding that some courts invalidate exclusionary
zoning as arbitrary and hence violative of the landowner's due process rights, see, e.g.,
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 469-71, 268 A.2d 765, 766-67 (1970),
the issues raised are significantly different from the question of a zoning amendment's
reasonableness normally involved in rezoning challenges. Consequently, this article is
not concerned with the standards of review of rezoning which may be exclusionary.
Nor will it consider the review standards of zoning ordinances which may abridge other
constitutional rights, see, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (downzoning which barred
low-cost, black housing project was a racially discriminatory violation of equal protec-
tion); Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (annual unit quota on residential construction violates first amendment right to
travel).
25. See I ANDERSON §§ 2.14-.16.
26. An ordinance which amounts to a taking of property without compensation,
which is proscribed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, is one
which deprives the owner of all use of the land for any purpose to which it is reason-
ably adaptable. See Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938). If a taking cannot be established, the downzoning might be barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel or vested rights. The universal rule is that an owner
acquires no right to use his land in accordance with existing zoning by mere purchase
in reliance thereon. Many courts apply the principles of equitable estoppel and vested
rights (which some courts use interchangeably) to prevent the downzoning from apply-
ing to the landowner if he has substantially relied in good faith on government conduct.
For an excellent analysis of the variations among states, see Heeter, Zoning Estoppel:
Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Dis-
. 298 ,[Vol. 24:294
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The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board, and
if the reasonableness of the ordinance is even "fairly debatable," it must be
sustained. 27 Moreover, the courts generally will not inquire into the motives
of the Board members. 28 Thus, the task of proving arbitrariness under this
standard has been extremely difficult. 29  While the Court in Euclid applied
these principles to test the validity of an entire municipal zoning scheme, the
majority of courts have applied this standard in reviewing piecemeal rezoning
ordinances as well. 3
0
A. The Comprehensive Plan Requirement
Underlying the Court's reasoning in Euclid was the assumption that the
exercise of the zoning power would be premised upon a rational and produc-
tive use of community planning. This philosophy is reflected in the require-
ment of nearly every state zoning enabling act that all zoning be enacted in
accordance with a comprehensive plan for land use.3 1  Failure to meet this
requirement renders the ordinance ultra vires and therefore void.8 2 Theoret-
ically, the comprehensive plan requirement assures the affected landowner
that a piecemeal rezoning is necessary to subserve the overriding public inter-
est in rational community development. Practical application of the require-
putes, 1971 URBAN L. ANNUAL 63. While accrual of vested rights is contingent upon
pecuniary reliance manifested by a physical change in the land, a liberalizing trend may
be discernible which would extend these principles to pecuniary reliance prior to actual
physical construction. See Imperial Homes v. Town of Largo, Civil No. 37,160 (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Aug. 1, 1973); Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va.
355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972); Gruber v. Mayor & Twp. Comm'n, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d
489 (1962) (semble).
27. See Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927).
28. See 1 ANDERSON § 4.18; Comment, supra note 6, at 140 n.80.
29. See Comment, supra note 6, at 131-32.
30. See 1 ANmSON § 2.14, at 69 & n.2. These standards have been sustained re-
cently in federal court. See South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.
1974) (en banc) (local rezoning decisions are quasi-legislative in character, entitled
to a presumption of validity, and not subject to federal judicial intervention in the ab-
sence of arbitrary action), overruling 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert.
dismissed, 416 U.S. 901 (1974) (rezoning of specific parcels is adjudicative in character,
requires adherence to minimal due process including statement of reasons for action and
non-recourse to evidence de hors the record).
31. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (1926). For a comprehensive survey
of the enabling laws, see Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Pro-
grams, 50 IowA L. REv. 367, 368-80 (1965).
The requirement that zoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is a nearly
universal requirement of state zoning enabling legislation. See Haar, In Accordance
With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155-56 (1955).
32. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968).
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ment, however, has shown that it affords little protection against arbitrary
rezoning.
The problem has been largely one of definition. Without legislative
guidance, the courts have been unwilling to require adherence to a written
master plan or other such planning document.33  In fact, the absence of any
type of written plan does not invalidate a zoning ordinance.A4 Rather, the
comprehensive plan "may be garnered from any available source, most espe-
cially the master plan of the community, if any has been adopted, the zoning
law itself and the zoning map."'3
5
Since the comprehensive plan is a concept which lacks concrete definition,
it is often difficult to determine whether a given zoning amendment conforms
to the plan. This difficulty is compounded by the necessity of allowing the
political subdivision to modify the plan itself as need occasions.3 6 Therefore,
it is sometimes argued in defense of a piecemeal zoning ordinance that, while
the amendment conflicts with the existing comprehensive plan, it is intended
to modify and supplant the plan and the new plan is embodied in the very
amendment which is challenged. 37
In view of the practical difficulties involved in construing the comprehen-
sive plan requirement, courts have merely required that the zoning ordinance
be well thought out and not arbitrary.38 Thus, while the comprehensive plan
requirement was conceived as an independent test of validity, it has become
no more than a reflection of the constitutional test of "reasonableness. '39
In Udell v. Haas,4a an opinion which imparted greater significance to the
comprehensive plan requirement, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted
the requirement in terms markedly dissimilar from the weight of authority
and its own past pronouncements. 4 1 Viewing the comprehensive plan as a
33. Courts have not equated the master plan with the comprehensive plan because
this would merge the planning function with the zoning function and elevate the plan-
ner's decisions to the status of law. See, e.g., Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore
County, 266 Md. 339, 354-55, 292 A.2d 680, 687-88 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 165-66, 131 A.2d 1,
7-8 (1957). The court also noted that in 1954, while there were 371 zoning ordinances
in the state, there were only 320 planning boards and only 112 master plans.
35. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 472, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888,
896 (1968).
36. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 372, at 383 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Gruber v. Mayor & Twp. Comm'n, 39 N.J. 1, 11, 186 A.2d 489,
494 (1962).
38. See, e.g., Storch v. Zoning Bd., 267 Md. 476, 488-89, 298 A.2d 8, 15-16 (1972).
39. See Haar, supra note 31, at 1157, 1171-72, 1173.
40. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
41. Compare id., with Rodgers v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121-22, 96 N.E.2d
731, 733 (1951); see Haar, supra note 31, at 1170-71.
[Vol. 24:294
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protection against arbitrary decisionmaking, the court noted that "[w]ith the
heavy presumption of constitutional validity [of zoning ordinances] . . . and
the difficulty in judicially applying a 'reasonableness' standard, ' 42 the land-
owner might be tyrannized if the courts do not require more than "mock
obeisance" to the statutory requirement. 43  Therefore, the court would de-
mand "clarity and specificity . . . in the articulation of the premises" upon
which a zoning ordinance is based, thereby providing more effective judicial
Teview. 44 Moreover, the court evinced an intent to scrutinize piecemeal re-
zonings more closely for compliance with the comprehensive plan require-
ment."'
Finding that the downzoning of several small lots from commercial use to
residential use conflicted with the town's basic land use scheme for commer-
cial development of the area, 46 the court declared the downzoning invalid as
ultra vires the enabling act. While the court emphasized the importance of
professional land use study, it did not accept the professionals' recommenda-
tions at face value. Rather, the recommendations of the village's planning
consultants were rejected as being inconsistent with the basic land use scheme
of the community.
A more emphatic departure from the presumption of the validity of piece-
meal rezonings was made in Roseta v. County of Washington.47 The Oregon
Supreme Court shifted the burden of proving that the rezoning amendment
accords with the comprehensive plan to the governing body. From the
enabling act, the court extrapolated a legislative intent to regard the require-
ment as stricti juris which justified shifting the burden of proof. This
42. 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
43. Id. at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
44. Id.
45. Where ... local officials adopt a zoning amendment to deal with various
problems that have arisen, but give no consideration to alternatives which
might minimize the adverse effects of a change on particular landowners, and
then call in the experts to justify the steps already taken in contemplation
of anticipated litigation, closer judicial scrutiny is required to determine
whether the amendment conforms to the comprehensive plan.
Id. at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894-95.
46. The stated development goals of the community set forth two years previously
provided for continued low density residential development with a peripheral commer-
cial supporting area to strengthen the tax base. Previous amendments had rezoned areas
adjacent to the plaintiff's lots for commercial use. The court determined that these
factors demonstrated that the pattern of peripheral commercial use constituted the "com-
prehensive plan." The findings of the village's experts that it "is the feeling of the
Village" that it did not want extensive business in that area was held not a sufficient
expression of public interest to warrant the zone change in the absence of a deliberate
change in community policy reflected in a careful planning study.
47. 254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969).
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approach, or variations of it, has been adopted in only a few jurisdictions. 48
Occasionally, it has been suggested that many of the abuses associated with
rezoning could be ameliorated by judicial insistence on compliance with the
comprehensive plan requirement. 49 'Nevertheless, several limitations of the
comprehensive plan requirement as a means of providing more meaningful
review are apparent. First, the comprehensive plan requirement is a statu-
tory one which exists apart from, and should not limit, the inquiry of whether
the amendment comports with constitutional requirements. Second, the prob-
lems inherent in defining a comprehensive plan in a given instance make it
difficult to determine whether a rezoning is consonant with the comprehen-
sive plan in many situations. When the amendment effects a change in
use, as in Udell, the problem is less pronounced. But where, as in Snell,
the amendment effects a less dramatic change (as from a residential high
rise to a townhouse classification) greater difficulty arises in determining if
the amendment conforms to the comprehensive plan. Several courts, includ-
ing the Oregon Supreme Court, have enlarged the scope of reviewing whether
the amendment complies with constitutional requirements as well as with the
comprehensive plan requirement. 50
B. The Change or Mistake Rule
'For at least three decades a few state courts have held that the strong pre-
sumption of the correctness of the original zoning necessarily weakens the
presumptive validity of subsequent piecemeal changes. 5' A piecemeal
48. Roseta and D'Angelo v. Knights of Columbus Bldg. Ass'n, 89 R.I. 76, 151 A.2d
495 (1959) (semble), both implemented this rule in the context of spot zoning; the rule,
therefore, may not be applicable to other rezoning situations. See note 12 supra. Com-
pare Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 242-
43, 309 N.E.2d 763, 773 (1974) (burden on plaintiff), with Raabe v. City of Walker,
383 Mich. 165, 178, 174 N.W.2d 789, 796 (1970) (absence of a comprehensive plan
weakens the presumption of validity which otherwise would attach to a rezoning).
49. See Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 161, 168, 458 P.2d 405, 409
(1969).
50. See p. 304 & notes 59 & 60 infra.
51. See, e.g., Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, 176 Colo. 576, 492 P.2d 65 (1971)
(evidence of material change of conditions required to justify rezoning); Clark v.
City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961); Mayor & Council of Rockville v.
Stone, 271 Md. 655, 319 A.2d 536 (1974); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 347, 79
A.2d 387, 391 (1951) (rezoning valid if original zoning was based on mistake); North-
west Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 (1948) (rezoning in-
valid unless based on changed conditions); Underwood v. City of Jackson, 300 So. 2d
442 (Miss. 1974); Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966). Connecticut
and Oregon, states which formerly applied the rule, see Zoning Comm'n v. New Canaan
Bldg. Co., 146 Conn. 170, 148 A.2d 330 (1959); Page v. City of Portland, 17
Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946), now appear to have abandoned it. See Andrew C.
Petersen, Inc. v, Town Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn., 638, 228 A.2d 126 (1967)
[Vol. 24:294
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change is invalid unless warranted by strong evidence of a substantial change
of conditions, or by a mistake in the original zoning.5 2 In some jurisdictions
it appears that the zoning board, as the proponent of the change, must assume
the burden of proving that a change or mistake has occurred. 53 The
Maryland courts, the chief proponents of the doctrine, have rigidly inter-
preted the rule and seem to require a change in physical conditions currently
operating upon the neighborhood as a precondition to a piecemeal zoning
change.5
4
The limitation this rule may sometimes place on planning flexibility is
illustrated in MacDonald v. Board of County Commissioners.55 The zoning
board approved high rise zoning for a 29-acre parcel of a proposed 650-acre
development. The 650-acre tract was part of a large area in the county
which had been zoned rural agricultural (minimum lot size V acre), but
which remained largely undeveloped. The proposed development plan was
based on innovative planning concepts designed to provide a mixture of com-
patible uses while maximizing open space and recreational acreage. The
Maryland Court of Appeals held the high rise zoning invalid, apparently be-
cause there had been no significant change in physical circumstances.
56
Thus, the court's decision foreclosed the utilization of an innovative planning
concept of mixing densities either because the concept was unknown at the
time of the original zoning or because the board did not appreciate, as it later
did, the advantages of its adoption. Therefore, the narrow interpretation of
change or mistake effectively locked the board into what it regarded as an
antiquated zoning plan for that area. As expressed by the dissent, the Mary-
land change or mistake rule fails to consider that ideas change.
57
(by implication); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973). See generally 1 ANDERSON § 4.29; 1 C. RATHEOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 27-14 (1974).
52. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 687, 215 A.2d 209,
213 (1965). In this respect, the Virginia rule differs in that it does not require strong
evidence of a change or mistake and its application is limited to downzonings. See
Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659 n.1, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893
n.1 (1974); pp. 305-06 infra.
53. See 1 ANDERSON § 4.29, at 210-11. The burden of proof established under this
rule differs from that adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court in Snell. See pp. 307-
08 inf ra.
54. The court does not define the rule in these terms; however, a reading of the
cases lends support to this conclusion. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79
A.2d 387 (1951). This interpretation of the majority approach was voiced in dissent
in MacDonald. See 238 Md. at 581, 210 A.2d at 343 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
55. 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
56. See note 54 supra.
57. 238 Md. at 579, 210 A.2d at 342 (Barnes, J., dissenting),
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II. PIECEMEAL ZONING AS A QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,58 the Oregon Supreme
Court broke sharply with precedent in holding that piecemeal zoning amend-
ments are the product of quasi-judicial action, not legislative action.59 Focus-
ing on the nature of the zoning board's activity, the court determined that
ordinances which establish general policies are legislative acts, whereas those
which apply to specific parcels of property are quasi-judicial and enjoy no
legislative presumption of validity. The court reasoned that "local and small
decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and
national legislatures" and noted the "almost irresistible pressures that can be
asserted by private economic interests on local government . ... -0 Re-
jected was the argument that the separation of powers doctrine required the
courts to accord every ordinance a full presumption of validity. To do so,
said the court, would permit rezonings to be "shielded from less than constitu-
tional scrutiny."' 61
58. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
59. Several recent opinions have embraced this principle. See Dillon Companies,
Inc. v. City of Boulder, 515 P.2d 627, 630 (Colo. 1973) (ruling on application for
rezoning for planned unit development was adjudicative in nature and district court's
order to grant rezoning request was proper when denial of request lacked any compe-
tent evidence to support the findings); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich.
139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179, 193 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring) (when rulings on individ-
ual applications for rezoning and piecemeal rezoning amendments are adjudicative in na-
ture they are subject to direct review by courts on the merits of the proposed use); Lowe
v. City of Missoula, 525 P.2d 551, 554 (Mont. 1974) (piecemeal downzoning is ad-
judicative in nature and invalid as an abuse of discretion when review of entire record
reveals that city council acted upon information which was lacking in fact and founda-
tion).
The ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974)
follows the Fasano rule. See section 2-312 and accompanying comment which desig-
nates as "Special Amendments" those amendments which result in a change limited in
effect to a single parcel or to several parcels under related ownership, or which change
regulations applicable to an area of 50 acres or less. The section, with certain excep-
tions, permits amendments only if the "development at the proposed location is essential
or especially appropriate in view of the available alternatives within or without the ju-
risdiction . . . " (§ 2-312(2) (a)). Moreover, the section requires that adoption of a
special amendment be preceded by a quasi-judicial-type hearing (§ 2-304), rather than a
legislative-type hearing (§ 2-305).
60. 264 Ore. at 580, 588, 507 P.2d at 26, 30.
61. Id. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26. For a view that the basis of the Fasano opinion is
statutory interpretation of the state enabling act, not due process, see Mattis, The Year of
Fasano: What Thirty-Two Acres Hath Wrought, reprinted in ALI-ABA/ULI STUDY
MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 77-78. Although the author concedes that the procedural
safeguards required by the court may reach "constitutional proportions," he states that
it is "more than possible to rationalize the procedural pronouncements as a type of 'com-
mon law' or further extrapolation of elements adhering in the statutes once the court
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Under this standard, piecemeal rezoning amendments must be justified by
the proponent of the change. The proponent assumes the burden of proving,
at a minimum, that a public need for the change exists, that the need will
be best satisfied by changing the particular piece of property, and that the
change conforms with the comprehensive plan. The court established a slid-
ing scale under which the level of proof necessary to show the above factors
will increase with the degree of change. Moreover, "as the degree of change
increases, the burden of showing that the potential impact upon the area in
question was carefully considered and weighed will also increase. ' 6 2 The
court noted, however, that a mistake in the original zoning or change in physi-
cal conditions might justify, but will not delimit, the determination of the
existence of the public need for a zoning change.
Other consequences of the characterization of small scale rezoning pro-
ceedings as quasi-judicial are the procedural safeguards which must be pro-
vided in the amendatory process. 3 Exactly what procedures will be required
is uncertain; 64 however, the court gave some guidance as to what a few of
the requirements are:
Parties at the hearing before the county governing body are en-
titled to an opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity to present
and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the mat-
ter-i.e., having had no prehearing or ex parte contacts con-
cerning the question at issue-and to a record made and ade-
quate findings executed. 65
III. Snell: A NEW TWIST IN THE CHANGE OR MISTAKE RULE
In Snell, the Virginia Supreme Court established a standard of review
which undercut the traditional presumption of validity accorded legislation.
The Virginia rule, in this respect, parallels the development of review stand-
ards in Maryland and Oregon.
A. Nature and Effect of the Decision
In ruling that piecemeal downzonings are invalid absent a change in cir-
cumstances or a mistake in the original zoning, the court relied heavily on the
determined the adjudicatory nature of the small scale rezone proceeding." Id. at 82-
83.
62. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
63. See generally Comment, supra note 6.
64. The procedures which satisfy due process requirements vary with the circum-
stances, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), and the court did not
attempt to fully define them in Fasano.
65. 264 Ore. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30.
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state zoning enabling act. The court premised its decision on two statutory
policies. First, the statutes establish a deliberate balance between private
property rights and public interests. Zoning bodies are instructed to zone with
"reasonable consideration for . . . the conservation of properties and their
values." 66  Second, the statutes establish as one purpose of zoning the
encouragement of economic development which provides desirable employ-
ment and enlarges the tax base.67 The court reasoned that the change or
mistake rule will establish predictability and stability in the law. Stability
of permissible land uses conserves legitimate profit expectations, thereby en-
couraging investment, with the result that land will be put to "its optimum
use to fulfill societal needs."68 Thus, the court concluded that the rule pro-
motes the policies and purposes of the enabling act.
69
Unfortunately, the court's terse statement of the Virginia change or
mistake rule affords little indication of the decision's reach. Since no facts
were presented in Snell which seriously controverted whether a change had
66. 214 Va. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 892, quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-490 (1973).
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489(7) (1973).
68. 214 Va. at 657, 202 S.E.2d at 892. A concern that zoning laws not discourage
investment and retard community development has been voiced elsewhere. "[lit is not
enough to regulate land development. There must be incentive to develop, or else there
will be little new housing except that which government could afford to build." Golden
v. Planning Bd., (Ramapo) 30 N.Y.2d 359, 390, 285 N.E.2d 291, 309, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, 162 (1972) (Breitel & Jasen, JJ., dissenting, citing D. MANDELKER, ThE ZONING
DILEMMA 47-51 (1971)), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1973).
See Betts, The Police Power-Rezoning to Lower Density, APPRAISAL J., Jan. 1974, at
86, for a professional appraiser's insight into just how uncertain land values can be-
come when the potential for unrestrained downzonings exists. A reasonable implication
of Mr. Betts' analysis is that uncertainty often makes investment speculative, thereby
discouraging redevelopment.
69. While the court justified its decision as promoting the purposes of the enabling
act, it did not go so far as to hold that amendments enacted in the absence of a change
or mistake exceeded the authority conferred by the statute. Indeed, the statutory lan-
guage provides little basis for such an interpretation. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-
489, 15.1-490 (1973), with § 15.1-491(g) (grant of power to amend regulations). But
cf. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (Super. Ct. 1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972), retried, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. 1974) (zoning ordinance which does not meet
regional housing needs held ultra vires because not in furtherance of the purposes of the
enabling act, i.e., the furtherance of the general welfare).
The sections of the enabling act relied upon by the court reasonably support the
court's conclusion that the act requires a board to carefully consider the effect of a pro-
posed downzoning on private property and community development. A failure to do so
would be evidence of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. However, those sections set
forth the general purposes 'to be effected by the zoning power and only a very strained
interpretation could establish as their intended effect a substantive limitation on the
power of local governments to rezone. Therefore, it is arguable that the court's reliance
on the enabling act as the basis of its decision should preclude a restrictive definition
of change or mistake.
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occurred, the court was not called upon to specify which factors might con-
stitute a change justifying a piecemeal downzoning. 70 Nor did the court
volunteer dicta which might provide some insight. On the basis of this
limited opinion, it is somewhat conjectural to predict the development of the
rule in future cases. Yet the way in which the rule is defined is likely to
affect land use regulation significantly.
If in future cases the court limits evidence of change to physical changes
which occur subsequent to the original zoning, it will have aligned itself
with the Maryland court's apparent development of the rule. As Mac-
Donald illustrates, the Maryland court's rigid interpretation of "change,"
to the extent that it establishes a strict precondition to a zoning change,
effects a substantive limitation on the power of local governments to rezone.
In this sense, the rule may be thought of as something "akin to administrative
res judicata. '' 71 On the other hand, the court may define a change or mistake
which substantially affects the public health, safety, or welfare in broad terms.
Theoretically, the change or mistake rule may be flexible enough to allow
consideration of a range of socioeconomic variables including demographic
changes, changed ideas and planning concepts. Defined in these terms, the
rule, rather than establishing a strict precondition to a zoning change, merely
requires the governing body to delineate the reasons for the change, and
thereby provides the court with a sounder basis for applying the constitutional
test of reasonableness.
B. Burden of Proof
Under the rule announced in Snell, once the landowner makes a prima
facie showing that no change of circumstances has occurred since enactment
of the existing zoning, the burden shifts to the governing body to produce
evidence sufficient to render the existence of a change or mistake fairly
debatable. Failure to introduce such evidence renders the downzoning or-
dinance presumptively unreasonable and invalid. While the requirement
arguably shifts the burden of proof to the governing body, it may be more
accurate to regard -the rule as shifting the burden of production of evidence
70. The county conceded that no change of physical circumstances had occurred
since the rezoning by the previous board. Brief for Appellants at 22, Board of Supervi-
sors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974). The county did con-
tend that the election of a new board constituted a change within the rule. Arguably,
the court's rejection of this argument indicates an intention to limit the change require-
ment to physical changes. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that a change of
board members, in the absence of any evidence of a need for the zoning change in terms
of social changes or new planning concepts or policies, does not preclude consideration
of the latter as satisfying the change requirement.
71. 1 ANDERSON § 4,29, at 209.
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to the governing body.72 Thus, the requirement might merely be regarded
as a reflection of the maxim that even a moving party should not be required
to prove a negative fact once a prima facie case has been made, at least
where the facts in issue are peculiarly within the knowledge of the adverse
party.73  Otherwise, the landowner would be placed in the difficult position
of proving the absence of a change or mistake.
Even if the rule does effectively shift the burden of proof to the governing
body, the burden imposed is minimal. The board needs only to introduce
evidence sufficient to render the existence of a change or mistake fairly de-
batable, a standard of proof much lower than proof by a preponderance of
evidence, the normal standard in civil cases.
74
The incidence of the burden of proof under the Maryland change or mis-
take rule is unclear. While the courts have sometimes said that a presump-
tion of validity applies to zoning amendments, more frequently noted is the
presumption that the original ordinance is valid. 75 Therefore, the burden of
proof of mistake or change rests with the board as the proponent of the
change.
Under the Fasano rule, the burden of proof appears to rest with the zoning
board whenever it has approved a piecemeal rezoning. The court explained
that, "[b]ecause the action of the commission [board] in this instance is an
exercise of judicial authority, the burden of proof should be placed, as is usual
in judicial proceedings, upon the one seeking change. ' '70  It seems, there-
fore, the proponent of the change alluded to by the court is the applicant
72. The shifting burden here pertains to the burden of proof only in its secondary
sense. It refers to shifting the burden to produce evidence to the defendant, not to a
shifting of the risk of non-persuasion. See, e.g., Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 594
(1923); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
73. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, §§ 2486, 2489; 31A C.J.S. Evi-
dence §§ 112-13 (1964).
74. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (2d ed. 1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 73, § 2498; 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1020 (1964); 30 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence
§ 1163 (1967).
75. Compare Board of County Comm'rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209
(1965), and DePaul v. Board of County Comm'rs, 237 Md. 221, 205 A.2d 805 (1965)
(burden on proponent of rezoning change challenging board's refusal to rezone prop-
erty), with MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325
(1965) (burden on party urging validity of rezoning amendment to overcome strong
presumption of validity of original zoning), and American Oil Co. v. Miller, 204 Md.
32, 102 A.2d 727 (1954); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951)
(presumption of validity applies to rezoning as well as to original zoning, but not with
as great a force).
76. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
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for the zoning change appearing before the zoning board. Under established
principles of administrative review, the board's determination, whether ap-
proving or rejecting the application for a change, should be accorded a pre-
sumption of regularity when reviewed by the court. 77
However, the court added the following language which conflicts with this
interpretation: "As the degree of change increases, the burden of showing
that the potential impact upon the area in question was carefully considered
and weighed will also increase. ' 78 The court's reference to the burden of
showing that the potential impact was carefully considered and weighed
apparently applies to the zoning board and belies the assumption that the
burden of proof referred to by the court is that of the applicant. Rather,
it appears that the court has shifted the burden of proof to the zoning board
when defending its zoning change before the court. In effect, the Oregon
Supreme Court, much like the Maryland courts, has ascribed a presumption
of validity to the original zoning but not to the later determination of the
zoning board to rezone. Thus, the zoning board, though actually -the
defendant before the court, is placed in the procedural posture of a moving
party appearing before the court in the first instance. Clearly, this result
does not flow from the designation of piecemeal rezoning as a judicial
function.
IV. THE QUASI-JUDICIAL LABEL
As courts reconsider the standards of reviewing rezonings, whether they
characterize rezoning proceedings as quasi-judicial or legislative will have a
dramatic impact upon the rights of the parties involved and the community's
interest in rational development. The disparate approaches taken by the
courts which have considered the question are likely to serve as guides for
future decisions, and it is important, therefore, to examine their theoretical
bases in light of the significant interests they affect.
A. Change or Mistake Rule
The theoretical basis for the change or mistake rule has not been explained
by the courts beyond stating that the original zoning was designed to be more
or less permanent and presumed to be valid. Therefore, changes cannot be
accorded the same presumption of validity. 79 In rejecting that argument, one
court replied that the original ordinance was a legislative act presumed to
77. See note 82 intra.
78. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29.
79. See cases cited note 75 supra.
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be valid when enacted, and the piecemeal rezoning amendment which super-
seded it likewise was a legislative act and also presumed valid.80 Therefore,
it appears that the change or mistake rule implicitly assumes that the enact-
ment of piecemeal rezoning amendments, if not quasi-judicial acts, are at
least something less than legislative acts. Yet, aside from shifting the burden
of proof, the courts have neither altered review standards for piecemeal
rezonings nor required procedural safeguards in the decisionmaking process.
Instead the courts have focused on reviewing the substantive decision itself
and not the fairness and rationality of the decisionmaking process. The
emphasis on stability has limited planning flexibility without necessarily pro-
tecting the rights of the parties involved. Although the requirement that the
board prove a change may reveal arbitrary and capricious action to the court
as an ancillary benefit, the rule fails to guide local decisionmakers or land-
owners adequately.
B. The Fasano Rule
Notwithstanding the formal organization of zoning boards as legislative
bodies, the Fasano rule apparently regards them as performing the quasi-
judicial decisionmaking of an administrative agency when engaged in piece-
meal rezoning. The following generalized principles of administrative law
should apply to the review of board proceedings:81
1) The determinations of the board are accorded a presumption of regu-
larity.82
2) When the board engages in adjudicatory factfinding, a number of
procedural safeguards must be employed. Legislative factfinding
does not require the full range of procedural safeguards.8 3
3) The court's review of the board's findings of fact is limited to the
determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the
board's findings.
84
80. Bartlett v. Township of Middletown, 51 N.J. Super. 239, 261, 143 A.2d 778, 790
(Super. Ct. 1958).
81. These observations are simplifications of a vast body of law which is pregnant
with troublesome and controversial questions.
82. See City of Colorado Springs v. District Court, 519 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. 1974),
quoting United States v. Chem. Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 74, § 343; 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law §§ 750-51 (1962).
83. See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 177-80 (1965). See also Bi-Me-
tallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v. City of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
84. See 4 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.01 (1958).
In recent decades the principal guide to the meaning of substantial evidence
has been a Supreme Court statement written by Chief Justice Hughes: "Sub-
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4) The court can substitute its judgment for that of the board on legal
questions, but will normally give some deference to the board's de-
terminations when the issues raised require special expertise or when
the determinations involve mixed questions of fact and law.85
Theoretically, article III courts and their state counterparts cannot constitu-
tionally exercise legislative discretion.8 6  In practice, however, the difficulty
of determining whether an issue presents legal or factual questions can often
result in the substitution of judicial for administrative judgment.
8 7
The Fasano rule may well foreshadow the introduction of these problems
in zoning cases. In addition to proving compliance with the statutory plan
requirement, the proponent of the change assumes the burden of proving
"that there is a public need for the kind of change in question and that the
need is best met by the proposal under consideration. 88 Since planning
is more of an art than a science, and zoning changes involve numerous policy
choices and informed judgments, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
which there can be one best judgment as to the optimal land use policy -for a
given area. Therefore, the substitution of judicial for legislative judgment in
this area looms large, and with it the prospect of fragmented policymaking.
The procedural implications of the quasi-judicial label will fundamentally
alter the character of rezoning proceedings. The requirement that zoning
boards develop a complete record with adequate findings, provide impartial
decisionmakers with no ex parte contacts, and permit the introduction and
rebuttal of evidence, will go a long way towards improving the rationality
and fairness of the decisionmaking process. The courts, in ruling that exist-
ing procedures violate due process, will likely provoke a legislative response.
The legislative establishment of administrative procedures would provide
meaningful guidance to local decisionmakers and affected landowners. That
these procedures would unduly burden the rezoning process seems unlikely.8 9
stantial evidence is more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Id. at § 29.02, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
85. See 4 K.C. DAvis, supra note 84, §§ 30.01, 30.14. See generally Comment,
Abuse of Discretion: Administrative Expertise vs. ludicial Surveillance, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 40 (1966).
86. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); 4 K.C. DAVIS,
supra note 84, at § 29.10. The Constitution does not prevent a state from assigning non-
judicial functions to its courts. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210
(1908). However, the state constitutions often place such a limitation on state courts.
See, e.g., Rosslyn Gas Co. v. Fletcher, 5 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Va. 1933).
87. See 4 K.C. DAVIs, supra note 84, § 29.11, at 187.
88. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
89. An analysis of the procedural safeguards required under the quasi-judicial label
and their effect from the viewpoint of practical administration may be found in Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 140-42.
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C. An Alternative Conception
It has always been assumed that local zoning bodies are not the equivalent
in all respects of state and national legislatures. The notice and hearing re-
quirements prescribed by the enabling acts which apply to zoning (but not
to state and national legislatures) are evidence of this. 9° Moreover, these
requirements have been regarded as jurisdictional9 ' and appear to be of con-
stitutional dimension.02 Additionally, without abandoning the conception of
rezoning as legislative, some courts have required typically non-legislative
safeguards in reviewing rezoning decisions to ensure the "essential fairness"
of the proceedings. 3  Conceding the adjudicatory aspects of piecemeal
rezoning decisions, they nevertheless involve an important element of discre-
tionary policymaking which cannot and should not be enervated. Given the
hybrid nature of rezoning, it is anomalous to regard rezoning judgments as
strictly quasi-judicial in nature and subject to reversal unless they are
arbitrary, or are not based on substantial evidence. 94  Thus, while due
process may require the adoption of a number of procedural safeguards in
the decisionmaking process, it should not be thought to require expansion of
the scope of judicial review in a way which would permit substitution of the
court's judgment for that of the zoning board. 9
5
90. See 1 ANDERSON §§ 4.03, 4.11, 4.12.
91. Statutory requirements of notice and hearing preliminary to amendment of zoning
are mandatory and jurisdictional, and any amendment passed in contravention of these
requirements is void. See Village of Riverwoods v. County of Lake, 94 Ill. App. 2d 320,
327, 237 N.E.2d 547, 551 (1968); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 449, § 5, at 461 (1964).
92. See Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108
Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d 391 (1972); Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 65, 107
Cal. Rptr. 214, 228 (1973); Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 141 S.E.2d 536 (1965). An
enabling act which did not require notice was said to deprive a landowner of his prop-
erty without due process of law. See Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 391-
92, 60 P.2d 847, 850 (1936) (dictum).
93. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402.
408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (although the zoning commission "is a quasi-legislative body
and is not required to support its judgments with findings of fact," id. at 408, it is nev-
ertheless required to articulate the reasons for its downzoning action by making a state-
ment to the court within forty-five days); Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp. 683
(D.D.C. 1973).
94. But see Comment, supra note 6, which critically examined the basis for the wide-
spread belief that rezoning is a legislative function. The author concludes that rezon-
ing is a judicial or quasi-judicial function and outlines the procedural safeguards which
should be provided in the amendatory process. The author does not address the implica-
tions of the quasi-judicial designation for the scope of judicial review.
95. Compare ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, supra note 59, § 9-101(7),
which makes a piecemeal rezoning amendment subject to judicial review as an "order."
Although section 9-109 permits the court to declare an order invalid upon the usual




The traditionally narrow scope of judicial review of rezoning has increas-
ingly been attacked by the courts and commentators. With the validity of
the traditional standards open to serious question, it is important that courts
devise standards which will provide guidance for local decisionmakers and
ensure meaningful review for affected landowners without impinging on the
flexibility needed to implement new land use policies and without making
the courts super-legislatures.
Judicial insistence on strict compliance with the comprehensive plan
requirement would ameliorate many rezoning problems. However, limiting
extensive review to compliance with the comprehensive plan requirement in-
volves a danger that arbitrary decisionmaking may not be checked in some
situations. The designation of piecemeal rezoning as a quasi-judicial function
expands procedural safeguards, and while likely to promote rationality and
fairness in the decisionmaking process, poses a danger of substituting judicial
for administrative judgment. As an alternate approach, courts may regard
these proceedings as quasi-legislative, thus requiring procedural safeguards
while giving deference to the administrative determination and imposing the
burden of proof on the complainant.
The impact of the Virginia rule is largely uncertain. A requirement that
rezoning be predicated upon a change or mistake in physical circumstances,
to the extent that it places a substantive limitation on the power to rezone,
unnecessarily limits planning flexibility and should be avoided. If the court
defines the changed circumstances requirement broadly, it may steer a middle
course between the inefficacious protection provided by courts which accord
piecemeal downzonings a full presumption of validity, and the super-legisla-
tive role courts assume when the presumption of validity is totally rejected.
However, without a clearer statement of the nature of rezoning proceedings,
zoning boards and affected landowners lack a meaningful guide to their rights
and responsibilities.
Carmen D. Legato
monition for the court to consider the expertise of the administrative agency. See id.
§ 9-109(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
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